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An institutional theory of the informal economy: some lessons from the 
United Kingdom 
 
Purpose 
The aim of this paper is to propose a new way of explaining participation in the informal 
economy as resulting from the asymmetry between the codified laws and regulations of a 
VRFLHW\¶VIRUPDOLQVWLWXWLRQVgovernment morality) and the norms, values and beliefs of the 
population that constitute its informal institutions (societal morality). The proposition is that 
the greater the asymmetry between government morality and societal morality, the greater is 
the propensity to participate in the informal economy.  
  
Methodology 
To evaluate this institutional asymmetry theory, the results are reported of 1,306 face-to-face 
interviews conducted during 2013 in the United Kingdom.  
  
Findings 
The finding is a strong correlation between the degree of institutional asymmetry (measured 
by tax morale) and participation in the informal economy. The lower the tax morale, the 
greater is the propensity to participate in the informal economy. Using ordered logistic 
regression analysis, tax morale is not found to significantly vary by for example social class, 
employment status or wealth, but there are significant gender, age and spatial variations with 
men, younger age groups, rural areas and Scotland displaying significantly lower tax morale 
than women, older people, urban areas and London.  
 
Practical Implications 
Rather than continue with the current disincentives policy approach, a new policy approach 
that reduces the asymmetry between government morality and societal morality is advocated. 
This requires not only changes in societal morality regarding the acceptability of participating 
in the informal economy but also changes in how formal institutions operate in order for this 
to be achieved.  
 
Originality/value 
This paper provides a new way of explaining participation in the informal economy and 
reviews its consequences for understanding and tackling the informal economy in the UK.  
 
Keywords: informal sector; shadow economy; undeclared work; tax morale; institutional 
theory; United Kingdom. 
 
 
Introduction 
In recent years, numerous studies have revealed the informal economy to be a sizeable 
proportion of contemporary economies. This is the case not only in the developing world 
(ILO, 2012; Rani et al., 2013) but also across the transition economies (Kus, 2014; Polese 
and Rodgers, 2011; Rodgers et al., 2008; Williams and Onoshchenko, 2014) as well as the 
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higher-income OECD nations (Schneider, 2013; Williams, 2006, 2014b). In the UK, for 
example, both Schneider and Williams (2013) and Murphy (2014) estimate the UK informal 
economy to be equivalent to some 10 per cent of GDP. The result is not only significant tax 
losses which reduces the public revenue available for spending on issues such as social 
protection and cohesion, but just as importantly, weakened trade union and collective 
bargaining, poorer working conditions and unfair competition for legitimate businesses 
(Andrews et al., 2011; ILO, 2014; TUC, 2008).  
The aim of this paper is to propose and evaluate a new way of explaining and tackling 
participation in this informal economy. Drawing upon institutional theory (Baumol, 1990; 
Baumol and Blinder, 2008; North, 1990), participation in the informal economy is here 
explained as resulting from the existence of an asymmetry between the codified laws and 
UHJXODWLRQV RI D VRFLHW\¶V IRUPDO LQVWLWXWLRQV (here termed µJRYHUQPHQW PRUDOLW\¶ and the 
norms, values and beliefs of its informal institutions (here termed µsocietal morality¶. The 
proposition is that the greater is the asymmetry between government morality and societal 
morality, the higher is the likelihood of participation in the informal economy. If valid, this 
has consequences for how the informal economy is tackled. A policy approach based on 
reducing this institutional asymmetry necessitates a very different approach to that currently 
adopted.  
To explore this, the first section briefly reviews previous explanations of the informal 
economy and their shortcomings along with the rapidly increasing number of empirical 
studies revealing a strong association between tax morale and participation in the informal 
economy. To marshal these empirical findings into a new theory of the informal economy, we 
draw on institutional theory to formulate the proposition that the greater is the asymmetry 
between government morality and societal morality, the greater is the propensity to 
participate in the informal economy. To evaluate this, the second section then introduces the 
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methodology and data used, namely an ordered logistic regression analysis of the association 
between participation in the informal economy and the degree of institutional asymmetry 
using a 2013 UK survey involving 1,306 face-to-face interviews. The fourth section then 
presents the results followed in the fifth section by a discussion of the theoretical and policy 
implications before the sixth and final section summarises the findings along with the 
limitations of the study and avenues for future research. 
 At the outset however, the informal economy needs to be defined. Castells and Portes 
(1989: 15) define this aVµDVSHFLILFIRUPRILQFRPHJHQHUDWLQJSURGXFWLRQ«XQUHJXODWHGE\
the institutions of society in a legal and social environment in which similar activities are 
UHJXODWHG¶$OWKRXJK this defines WKHLQIRUPDOHFRQRP\WKURXJKWKHOHQVRIERWKWKHµOHJDO¶ 
(formalDQGµVRFLDO¶ (informal) institutions in a society, it fails to recognise firstly, that even 
if unregulated by formal institutions, the informal economy is regulated by the rules of 
informal institutions and secondly, that even if activity is µillegal¶ from the viewpoint of 
formal institutions it can be µlegitimate¶ from the viewpoint of informal institutions (Siqueira 
et al., 2014; Webb et al., 2009). As such, and reflecting the consensus in the literature, we 
here define the informal economy as socially legitimate activity which is legal in all respects 
other than it is not declared to the authorities for tax, social security or labour law purposes 
(European Commission, 2007; OECD, 2012; Williams, 2014a,b). If it is not legal and 
legitimate in all other respects, it is not part of the informal economy. Whilst the formal 
economy is legal (from the viewpoint of formal institutions) and legitimate (from the 
viewpoint of informal institutions), the informal economy is illegal but legitimate, unlike the 
criminal economy (e.g., forced labour) which is both illegal and illegitimate (Ponsaers et al., 
2008).   
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Explaining participation in the informal economy: an institutional perspective 
Since the turn of the millennium, numerous studies reveal that participation in the informal 
economy varies not only by global region (ILO, 2013), cross-nationally (Likic-Brobric et al., 
2013; Papyrakis, 2014; Putni৆ã and Sauka, 2014; Schneider, 2013; Williams, 2014a,b) and 
locally and regionally (Kesteloot and Meert, 1999; Williams and Shahid, 2015), but also by 
age (Pedersen, 2003), JHQGHU,/2/HRQDUG6WăQFXOHVFXLQFRPH
level (Boels, 2014; Williams, 2004) and employment status (Brill, 2011; Williams et al., 
2013).  
To explain the informal economy, and as Williams (2014a) highlights, most studies 
have adopted one of three competing theoretical explanations)LUVWO\µPRGHUQLVDWLRQ¶WKHRU\
explains the informal economy in terms of the lack of economic development and 
modernisation of state bureaucracies (Geertz, 1969; ILO, 2013; Lewis, 1959)VHFRQGO\µQHR-
OLEHUDO¶ WKHRU\ H[SODLQV WKH informal economy as resulting from high taxes and over-
burdensome rules and regulations (De Soto, 2989, 2001; Nwabuzor, 2005) and third and 
ILQDOO\µSROLWLFDOHFRQRP\¶WKHRU\explains it to result from inadequate state intervention and 
a lack of safeguards for workers (Castells and Portes, 1989; Dau and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2014; 
ILO, 2014; Meagher, 2010; Slavnic, 2010). The problem with all these explanations which 
focus upon country-level conditions is that they are unable to take agency into account and 
explain why some individuals participate in the informal economy and others do not.  
In recent years however, empirical studies on µWD[ PRUDOH¶, defined as the intrinsic 
motivation to pay taxes owed, have begun to do so by examining how the acceptability of 
participation in the informal economy varies across individuals and populations (Cummings 
et al., 2009; McKerchar et al, 2013). The finding across a range of contexts is that usually tax 
morale is lower among men, single people, the unemployed and self-employed, and increases 
with religiosity, age, perceived social status and income but is negatively related to years 
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spent in formal education (Alm and Torgler, 2006; &DQQDULDQG'¶$OHVVLR'DXGHDQG
Melguizo, 2010; Daude et al., 2013; Kastlunger et al., 2013; Lago-Peñas and Lago-Peñas,  
2010; Martinez-Vazquez and Torgler, 2009; Williams and Martinez, 2014a,b). 
These empirical studies also reveal a strong relationship between tax morale and 
participation in the informal economy. The lower is the level of tax morale, the higher is the 
level of participation in the informal economy, with Pearson r values between -0.46 and -0.66 
(Alm and Torgler, 2006; Alm et al., 2006, Halla, 2010; Riahi-Belkaoui, 2004; Richardson, 
2006; Torgler, 2011; Torgler and Schneider 2009). Indeed, Alm and Torgler (2006) focusing 
on Europe and the United States find a strong negative correlation (Pearson r = -0.460) 
significant at the 0.05 level. Analysing the linear relationship in a simple regression indicates 
that the variable tax morale can explain 20 per cent of the total variance of the size of 
informal economy. Similarly, Alm et al. (2006) focusing on transition countries find a strong 
negative correlation (r =-0.657), significant at the 0.01 level; low tax morale is related with 
larger informal economies, with the variable tax morale explaining more than 30 per cent of 
the total variance of the size of informal economy. This is also the case in developing 
countries. Torgler (2005) finds in Latin America a strong negative correlation (-0.511), 
significant at the 0.05 level. 
Here, and to advance a new theorisation of the informal economy, we re-read these 
empirical studies through the lens of institutional theory (Baumol and Blinder, 2008; Helmke 
and Levitsky, 2004; North, 1990). Institutions represent µWKH UXOHV RI WKH JDPH¶; they 
prescribe the norms regarding the acceptability of activities (Baumol and Blinder, 2008; 
Denzau and North 1994; Mathias et al., 2014; North, 1990). All societies have not only 
formal institutions (i.e., codified laws and regulations) that define the legal rules of the game 
(prescribing ZKDWZHKHUHWHUPµgovernment PRUDOLW\¶but also informal institutions which 
DUHWKHµVRFLDOO\VKDUHGUXOHVXVXDOO\XQZULWWHQWKDWDUHFUHDWHGFRPPXQLFDWHGDQGHQIRUFHG
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RXWVLGH RI RIILFLDOO\ VDQFWLRQHG FKDQQHOV¶ +HOPNH DQG /HYLWVN\  , prescribing 
ZKDWZHKHUHWHUPµsocietal morality¶.  
The norms, values and beliHIV RI D VRFLHW\¶V Lnformal institutions can be either 
µFRPSOHPHQWDU\¶ LI WKH\ UHLQIRUFH IRUPDO LQVWLWXWLRQV RU µVXEVWLWXWLYH¶ LI WKHLU UXOHV are 
incompatible with those of the formal institutions (Helmke and Levitsky, 2003; North, 1990; 
Williams and Vorley, 2014). When there is symmetry between formal and informal 
institutions therefore, the informal economy will be largely absent. However, when there is 
asymmetry between D VRFLHW\¶V formal institutions (government morality) and its informal 
institutions (societal morality), such as due to a lack of trust in government, the informal 
economy will be larger. $V :HEE HW DO   SXW LW µWKH LQIRUPDO HFRQRP\ H[LVWV
because of the incongruence between what is defined as legitimate by formal and informal 
LQVWLWXWLRQV¶ When there is institutional asymmetry, the informal economy, DOWKRXJKµLOOHJDO¶
in terms of the formal rules, will be deemed VRFLDOO\ µOHJLWLPDWH¶ LQ WHUPV RI WKH LQIRUPDO
institutions (Siqueira et al., 2014). The empirical studies on tax morale (i.e., the social 
acceptability of the informal economy) measure the extent to which societal morality aligns 
with government morality (i.e., degree of institutional asymmetry). To test this new 
institutional theory of the informal economy, the following proposition can be therefore 
evaluated:  
 
Institutional asymmetry thesis: the lower is the tax morale, the greater is the 
propensity to participate in the informal economy. 
 
Data and methodology 
To evaluate this institutional asymmetry thesis, data is reported from special Eurobarometer 
survey no. 402, which involved 1,306 face-to-face interviews conducted in 2013 in United 
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Kingdom. A multi-stage random (probability) sampling methodology was employed which 
ensured that on the issues of gender, age, region and locality size, both the UK sample as well 
as each level of the sample, was representative in proportion to its population size. To analyse 
the UK, a weighting scheme is thus used which adjusts the British and the Northern Ireland 
samples to their respective proportions of the UK population. For univariate analysis, 
therefore, we employ this sample weighting scheme as recommended in both the wider 
literature (Sharon and Liu, 1994; Solon et al., 2013) and the Eurobarometer methodology, to 
obtain meaningful descriptive results. For the multivariate analysis however, a debate exists 
over whether to use a weighting scheme. Reflecting the dominant viewpoint, the decision was 
taken not to do so (Pfefferman, 1994; Sharon and Liu, 1994; Solon et al., 2013; Winship and 
Radbill, 1994).  
 The face-to-face interviews first asked participants attitudinal questions regarding 
their views on the acceptability of various informal economic practices, followed by 
questions on whether participants had purchased from the informal economy and finally, 
whether they had participated in the informal economy over the past year. Here, the focus is 
upon firstly, the attitudinal questions on the acceptability of working in the informal 
economy, which measure the level of tax morale, and secondly, the questions on whether 
they had participated in the informal economy.  
 To measure the level of tax morale, participants were asked six questions that rate 
their views on the acceptability of participating in the informal economy on a 10-point Likert 
scale (where 1 means absolutely unacceptable and 10 means absolutely acceptable), namely: 
an individual is hired by a household for work and s/he does not declare the payment received 
to the tax or social security authorities even though it should be declared; a firm is hired by a 
household for work and it does not declare the payment received to the tax or social security 
authorities; a firm is hired by another firm for work and it does not declare its activities to the 
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tax or social security authorities; a firm hires an individual and all or a part of the wages paid 
to him/her are not officially declared; someone receives welfare payments without 
entitlement, and someone evades taxes by not declaring or only partially declaring their 
income. An aggregate tax morale index for each individual is then created by collating 
SDUWLFLSDQWV¶UHVSRQVHVWRHDFKRIWKHVL[TXHVWLRQV7KH&URQEDFK¶V$OSKDFRHIILFLHQWLV
which shows an excellent internal consistency of the scale (Kline, 2000). The index has been 
represented here in the 10-point Likert scale original format. The lower the index value, the 
higher is the tax morale.  
The dependent variable is therefore the aggregate tax morale index. As the dependent 
variable is a 10-point Likert scale index, we here employ an ordered logistic regression 
analysis. To evaluate whether tax morale is associated with participation in the informal 
economy, we include a variable measuring this, and drawing upon the above tax morale 
studies above which reveal how gender, age, marital status, social class, occupation, income 
level and area influence tax morale, the independent variables selected are:  
x Participation in the informal economy: a dummy variable with recorded value 1 for 
SHUVRQV ZKR DQVZHUHG ³\HV´ WR WKH question, ³Have you yourself carried out any 
XQGHFODUHGSDLGDFWLYLWLHVLQWKHODVWPRQWKV"´DQGZLWKUHFRUGHGYDOXHRWKHUZLVH 
x Gender: a dummy variable with value 1 for men and 0 for women. 
x Age: a numerical variable for the exact age of the respondent. 
x Marital Status: a categorical variable for the marital status of the respondent with value 1 
for married/ remarried individuals, value 2 for cohabiters, value 3 for singles, value 4 for 
those separated or divorced, and value 5 for widowed. 
x Social class: a categorical variable for the respondent perception regarding social class of 
society to which it belongs with value 1 for working class of society, value 2 for middle 
class of society, and value 3 for higher class, other or none class of society. 
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x Household composition aged 15+: a categorical variable for people 15+ years in 
respondent`s household (including the respondent) with value 1 for one person, value 2 
for two persons, value 3 for 3 persons, and value 4 for 4 persons or more.  
x Number of children (up to 14 years old in the household): a categorical variable for 
number of children with value 1 for individuals with no children, value 2 for the presence 
of children less than 10 years old live in respondent`s household, value 3 for the presence 
of children aged 10 to 14 years old live in respondent`s household, and value 4 for the 
presence of children less than 10 years old and children aged 10 to 14 years old live in 
respondent`s household. 
x Occupation: a categorical variable for the occupation of the respondent with value 1 for 
self-employed, value 2 for employed, and value 3 for not working. 
x Difficulties paying bills: a dummy variable for the respondent difficulties in paying bills 
with value 1 for having difficulties and value 0 for not having difficulties in paying bills. 
x Urban/rural area: a categorical variable for the area where the respondent lives with 
value 1 for rural area or village, value 2 for small or middle sized town, and value 3 for 
large town. 
x UK region: a categorical variable for the region where the respondent lives with value 1 
for North West, value 2 for Northern Ireland, value 3 for North East, value 4 for 
Yorkshire and The Humber, value 5 for East Midlands, value 6 for West Midlands, value 
7 for East of England, value 8 for London, value 9 for South East, value 10 for South 
West, value 11 for Wales, and value 12 for Scotland. 
To analyse the results, firstly a descriptive analysis of the level of tax morale is provided, 
secondly, a simple bivariate regression of the relationship between tax morale and 
participation in the informal economy, and third and finally, an ordered logistic regression 
analysis to on the one hand, test the hypothesis that there remains an association between tax 
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morale and participation in the informal economy when other independent control variables 
are introduced and held constant and on the other hand, to identify whether any socio-
demographic, socio-economic and spatial variables are strongly associated with lower tax 
morale, so as to identify potential population groups where tax morale is weak. 
 
Findings 
The mean tax morale score for the UK population regarding the acceptability of participating 
in the informal economy is 2.02 (where 1 is totally unacceptable and 10 totally acceptable). 
The codified laws and regulations of formal institutions (government morality) and the 
norms, values and beliefs of the informal institutions (societal morality), therefore, are not 
wholly aligned (i.e., the tax morale score is not 1.00). 
Nevertheless, the social acceptability of participation in the informal economy varies 
according to whether a firm or individual participates. As Figure 1 displays, the UK 
population deem it more unacceptable for firms than individuals to operate in the informal 
economy. The mean tax morale score for a firm hiring an informal worker is 1.92 and 1.91 
for a firm doing informal work for a household, and is even lower (1.79) for firms doing 
informal work for another firm (i.e., the lower the score, the more unacceptable is the 
activity). Meanwhile, the UK population are more tolerant of individuals participating in the 
informal economy. The acceptability of a person partially or completely concealing their 
income is 1.97 and 2.63 for a person who engages in informal work for a household. The 
exception is those claiming benefits without entitlement, such as whilst working informally. 
This is the most unacceptable of all behaviours, scoring 1.69, doubtless because such 
individuals are here YLHZHG DV µWDNLQJ RXU PRQH\¶ UDWKHU WKDQ VHHNLQJ WR µNeep their own 
PRQH\¶Similar patterns regarding the relative social acceptability of these different types of 
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informal work are replicated across not only the EU15 but also the new member states of the 
European Union, whose overall tax morale is lower at 2.22 and 2.75 respectively.    
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Is it the case, therefore, as the institutional asymmetry thesis proposes, that there is a 
relationship between the level of tax morale and participation in the informal economy? To 
evaluate this, the first step is to test whether the tax morale of individuals participating in the 
informal economy is lower than the tax morale of those not participating in the informal 
economy. Given that the distribution of tax morale is non-parametric, a Wilcoxon Rank Sum 
test, also known as the Mann-Whitney two-sample statistic, is used. The finding is a strong 
statistically significant difference in the median tax morale of those participating in the 
informal economy, which is 3, compared with those not engaging in informal work, whose 
median score is 1. Those participating in the informal economy thus have significantly lower 
tax morale than those not participating in the informal economy. This provides support for 
the institutional asymmetry thesis.  
To determine whether this association between the level of tax morale and 
participation in the informal economy remains significant when other characteristics are 
taken into account and held constant, Table 1 reports the results of an ordered logistic 
regression analysis. The first row in models 1-3 reveals that lower tax morale remains 
strongly associated with participation in the informal economy across all models, whether 
socio-demographic variables alone are analysed, or whether socio-economic and/or spatial 
characteristics are added and held constant. This positively confirms the institutional 
asymmetry thesis; the greater is the non-alignment of government morality and societal 
morality, the higher is participation in the informal economy.  
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INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
This ordered logistic regression analysis also identifies the socio-demographic, socio-
economic and spatial groups significantly more likely to hold lower tax morale when all other 
characteristics are taken into account and held constant. As model 1 in Table 1 reveals, when 
other socio-demographic factors are held constant, men remain significantly more likely to 
have lower tax morale than women, as are younger age groups and people living in 
households with four or more adults. Interestingly however, there are no significant variations 
in tax morale for instance across social class or by marital status. When socio-economic 
characteristics are added in model 2, the same socio-demographic variables remain 
significant. However, neither employment status nor whether one has difficulties paying the 
bills significantly influence tax morale. The unemployed and those witnessing financial 
difficulties, for example, are not significantly more likely to have lower tax morale than those 
in employment and those without financial problems. Finally, when model 3 adds the spatial 
characteristics, the same socio-demographic variables continue to be significant and the 
additional finding is that rural areas have a lower tax morale than more urban areas, 
suggesting that participation in the informal economy may well be higher in such areas, 
which is reinforced by previous UK empirical studies comparing the prevalence of the 
informal economy in rural and urban areas (Williams, 2004). It is also the case that regional 
variations exist with Scotland having significantly lower tax morale than London, displaying 
perhaps how Scottish people have less allegiance to the codified rules and regulations of the 
UK government.      
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Discussion 
Evaluating the institutional asymmetry thesis, a strong association is found between tax 
morale (i.e., the asymmetry between government morality and societal morality) and the 
propensity to participate in the informal economy. When institutional asymmetry is higher, 
the likelihood of participation in the informal economy is greater and this remains strongly 
significant when other socio-demographic, socio-economic and spatial variables are 
introduced and held constant. This UK survey thus positively confirms an institutional theory 
of the informal economy which asserts that the likelihood of participating in the informal 
economy will be greater in populations where tax morale is lower. It also reveals the 
populations most likely to display lower tax morale, namely men, younger people, those in 
households with more than adults, living in rural areas and Scotland.    
This re-theorisation of the informal economy as resulting from the asymmetry 
between government morality and societal morality, moreover, has implications for how the 
informal economy is tackled. According to institutional theory, two basic mechanisms exist 
for tackling institutional asymmetry: disincentives (sticks) to prevent socially legitimate but 
illegal activities, or incentives (carrots) to encourage desirable legal activities (Matthias et al., 
2014; North 1990). Conventionally, governments have used disincentives to ensure that the 
cost of being caught and punished is greater than the pay-off from participating in the 
informal economy (Allingham and Sandmo, 1972). Firstly, penalties and sanctions have been 
raised and/or secondly, the likelihood of detection improved such as by increasing workplace 
inspections and by improving data sharing and matching to identify individuals engaged in 
informal work (e.g., Hasseldine and Li, 1999). The problem with this disincentives approach 
however, is that introducing tougher sanctions and improving detection reduces voluntary 
compliance because it undermines respect for the fairness of the system and leads to greater 
rather than less informality (Chang and Lai, 2004; Murphy, 2005; Murphy and Harris, 2007).  
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Hence, a rather different approach is required. Two options exist. Firstly, incentives to 
behave legally can be offered, such as direct and indirect tax incentives to either suppliers or 
consumers of informal work to operate in the formal economy. The problem however, is that 
offering incentives fails to deal with the underlying desire of people not to comply because 
their morality does not adhere with government morality. To tackle this, a second and rather 
different approach is required. Drawing inspiration from a large body of research at the 
RUJDQLVDWLRQDO OHYHO ZKHUH WKHUH KDV EHHQ D VKLIW IURP µKDUG¶ WR µVRIW¶ +50 DQG IURP
bureaucratic to post-bureaucratic management (Legge 1995; Thompson and Alvesson 2005; 
Watson 2003), a similar shift is here advocated at the societal level when tackling 
participation in the informal economy. In other words, a move is advocated away from a low 
commitment, low trust and adversarial µKDUG¶SROLF\DSSURDFK, which seeks compliance via 
prescribed procedures, tight rules, close supervision and monitoring and centralised 
structures. Instead, a high trust, high commitment µVRIW¶ SROLF\ DSSURDFK is advocated that 
fosters internalised commitment and self-regulation by seeking to align the norms, values and 
beliefs of the population µsocietal morality¶with the codified laws and regulations of formal 
institutions µgovernment PRUDOLW\¶. This requires changes in the norms, values and beliefs 
of the UK population. If this is to occur however, it also requires changes in formal 
institutions. 
 
Changing informal institutions  
To change informal institutions µsocietal morality¶, three policy initiatives can be pursued. 
Firstly, tax education is required to align the beliefs, norms and values of the population with 
the formal rules and elicit an intrinsic motivation to comply (Saeed and Shah, 2011). This 
requires not only the provision of easily consumable information on their responsibilities with 
regard to compliance (Vossler et al., 2011) but also education about the value and benefits of 
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paying taxes in order to elicit an intrinsic motivation to comply. For example, µ\RXUWD[HVDUH
SD\LQJ IRU WKLV¶ signs can be used in hospitals, on ambulances and on public construction 
projects, or letters informing taxpayers how their taxes have been spent, as recently adopted 
in the UK.   
Secondly, advertising campaigns about the benefits of working in the formal rather 
than informal economy can be used. These can either inform: employers or employees of the 
risks and costs of the informal economy, or employers and/or employees of the benefits of 
operating in the formal economy. Indeed, the evidence is that advertising campaigns are 
effective and cost efficient. In the UK, an evaluation of the advertising campaigns run by Her 
0DMHVW\¶V 5HYHQXH DQG &XVWRPV HMRC) reveals a return of 19:1 on the expenditure 
compared with a return of 4.5: 1 on expenditure detecting those operating in the informal 
economy (National Audit Office, 2008).  The above analysis reveals the population groups to 
be targeted by such advertising campaigns, namely men, younger people, those living in 
households with more than four adults, in rural areas and Scotland.  
And third and finally, appeals can be used. Hasseldine et al. (2007) examine 7300 sole 
proprietors in the UK. Comparing the effect of five different letters ranging from a simple 
assistance offer to a letter stating that their tax return had been pre-selected for audit, they 
find that appeals resulted in greater compliance. Sanction appeals however, were more 
effective than normative appeals.  
 
Changing formal institutions  
Improving tax morale nevertheless, does not simply require a focus upon changing societal 
morality. Formal institutions must also change. This requires at least three types of 
improvement. Firstly, procedural fairness is required, which is the extent to which citizens 
believe they are paying their fair share compared with others (Kirchgässner, 2011; Molero 
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and Pujol, 2012). People who receive procedurally fair treatment are more likely to trust that 
organisation and will be more inclined to accept its decisions and follow its directions 
(Murphy, 2005). Conversely, where unfair treatment is perceived either in absolute terms 
(e.g., the level of taxes paid, that taxes are wasted) or in relative terms (e.g., the suspected 
level of others evasion or payments), non-compliance increases. The implication is that if the 
authorities advertise that the informal economy is rife, they elicit grievance and thus 
engagement in the informal economy by those who might not have done so.   
Secondly, procedural justice is required, which refers to whether citizens believe that 
the tax authority treat them in a respectful, impartial and responsible manner (Murphy, 2005). 
This requires a shift IURP D µFRSV DQG UREEHUV¶ DSSURDFK DQG WRZDUGV D customer-service 
oriented approach (Kirchler, 2007; Murphy, 2005, 2008). Being treated with dignity and 
respect, politely, being given a say and having genuine respect shown for one rights and 
social status enhance compliance (Hartner et al., 2008; Murphy 2005; Tyler, 2006). 
Conversely, if citizens feel that they are treated unreasonably, this generates a lack of trust 
and resistance to compliance (Murphy, 2008).  
Third and finally, redistributive justice is required, which refers to whether they 
believe that they receive the goods and services they deserve given the taxes they pay 
(Kirchgässner, 2011). Taxes are prices for the goods and services provided by the 
government. The question for the moral evaluation of taxes is whether the price corresponds 
WRWKHYDOXHRIWKHVHVHUYLFHVLHZKHWKHULWLVVHHQDVµMXVW¶QDPHO\ZKHWKHUWKHUHLVDµMXVW
SULFH¶Kirchgässner, 2011). Citizens see themselves as more justified being non-compliant, 
the less they perceive the tax system as fair. If customers believe they receive what they view 
as appropriate public goods and services for the taxes they pay, their identification with the 
state increases and willingness to contribute is greater. If however, citizens do not receive the 
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goods and services that they believe they deserve given the taxes that they pay, then non-
compliance increases (McGee, 2005). 
 
Conclusions 
To explain participation in the informal economy, this paper has evaluated the relationship 
between the informal economy and tax morale. Viewing tax morale as a measure of the 
symmetry between the codified laws and regulations of formal institutions (government 
morality) and the unwritten socially shared rules of informal institutions (societal morality), 
the proposition has been tested that the lower the tax morale (i.e., the greater the asymmetry 
between government and societal morality), the greater is the propensity to participate in the 
informal economy. Using data from the UK, this paper has positively confirmed this new 
institutional theory of the informal economy.   
This has implications for reducing participation in the informal economy. It reveals 
the need for a policy shift away from the use of disincentives that detect and punish those 
participating in the informal economy and towards fostering a high trust high commitment 
culture to align societal morality with government morality. On the one hand, this requires 
improvements in tax morale using education and awareness raising measures regarding the 
benefits of paying taxes. On the other hand, and to facilitate this, it also requires changes in 
formal institutions by developing a service-oriented approach which treats taxpayers as 
clients and pursues greater procedural justice, procedural fairness and redistributive justice, 
so as to improve tax morale and reduce participation in the informal economy.  
The major limitation of this paper, nevertheless, is that although the quantitative 
analyses displays the importance of aligning societal morality with government morality, it 
has not identified the reasons for institutional asymmetry. Future qualitative research is 
therefore required to identify the reasons, such as whether it is due to a perception that tax 
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rates are too high, a lack of trust in government or lack of understanding of the taxation 
system and how taxes are used.  
In sum, this paper has outlined a new explanation for participation in the informal 
economy grounded in institutional theory. Whether this is valid in other European countries 
and global regions now requires evaluation. If this paper therefore stimulates such 
evaluations, it will have achieved one of its objectives. However, if governments also start 
viewing participation in the informal economy as resulting from lower tax morale and begin 
exploring policy measures for improving such morale, rather than persisting with the 
detection and punishment of those participating in the informal economy, then this paper will 
have achieved its wider intention.  
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Figure 1. Social acceptability of participation in different types of informal work: UK, EU15 
and new member states 
 
Notes: 
NMS ± Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland,           
Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Croatia 
EU15 (United Kingdom excluded.) ± Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Finland, France, Ireland, 
the Netherlands, Norway, Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain, Sweden.  
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Table 1. Acceptability of informal economy: ordered logistic model 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Informal work (Not engaged)    
Engaged 1.738*** (0.362) 1.745*** (0.365) 1.774*** (0.379) 
Gender (Women)    
Men 0.406*** (0.117) 0.406*** (0.119) 0.424*** (0.120) 
Age (exact age) -0.0130*** (0.004) -0.0137*** (0.005) -0.0149*** (0.005) 
Marital status (Re/Married)    
Single living with partner -0.0986 (0.201) -0.121 (0.204) -0.108 (0.203) 
Single -0.0610 (0.205) -0.0716 (0.215) -0.0572 (0.220) 
Divorced or separated 0.112 (0.242) 0.102 (0.246) 0.0986 (0.255) 
Widow 0.379 (0.268) 0.368 (0.273) 0.328 (0.279) 
Social class (The working class of 
society) 
   
The middle class of society 0.148 (0.117) 0.135 (0.119) 0.122 (0.123) 
The higher class/Other/None -0.413 (0.301) -0.429 (0.302) -0.467 (0.306) 
Household composition aged 15+ (One)    
Two 0.0569 (0.198) 0.0409 (0.201) -0.0107 (0.206) 
Three 0.175 (0.224) 0.196 (0.233) 0.0901 (0.238) 
Four or more 0.592** (0.249) 0.573** (0.255) 0.537** (0.261) 
Number of children (No children)    
Children < 10 years  -0.204 (0.183) -0.201 (0.183) -0.170 (0.182) 
Children 10-14 years 0.267 (0.205) 0.261 (0.209) 0.241 (0.218) 
One or more < 10 years and 10-14 years -0.124 (0.265) -0.133 (0.265) 0.000887 (0.274) 
Occupation (Self-employed)    
Employed  0.0368 (0.217) 0.141 (0.225) 
Not working  0.0515 (0.226) 0.0786 (0.231) 
Difficulties paying bills last year (Not having difficulties)   
Having difficulties  -0.0309 (0.136) -0.0140 (0.139) 
Area respondent lives (Rural area or village)   
Small/middle town   -0.380*** (0.144) 
Large town   -0.355** (0.173) 
Region (London)    
Northern Ireland   0.327 (0.237) 
North East   0..522 (0.368) 
Yorkshire and The Humber   0.192 (0.294) 
East Midlands   0.048 (0.316) 
West Midlands   0.449 (0.285) 
East of England   0.255 (0.283) 
North West   -0.476 (0.305) 
South East   0.153 (0.267) 
South West   0.234 (0.333) 
Wales   0.120 (0.407) 
Scotland   0.718** (0.305) 
Constant cut1 -0.202 (0.388) -0.225 (0.453) 0.134 (0.494) 
Constant cut2 0.750* (0.390) 0.718 (0.454) 1.092** (0.496) 
Constant cut3 1.616*** (0.393) 1.595*** (0.454) 1.982*** (0.497) 
Constant cut4 2.399*** (0.402) 2.372*** (0.464) 2.766*** (0.507) 
Constant cut5 3.171*** (0.419) 3.131*** (0.479) 3.531*** (0.521) 
Constant cut6 3.943*** (0.445) 3.903*** (0.500) 4.310*** (0.544) 
Constant cut7 4.604*** (0.486) 4.565*** (0.536) 4.977*** (0.576) 
Constant cut8 5.124*** (0.553) 5.084*** (0.593) 5.498*** (0.633) 
Constant cut9 6.227*** (0.799) 6.188*** (0.832) 6.600*** (0.859) 
N 1,169 1,155 1,155 
Pseudo R2 0.0225 0.0222 0.0303 
Log likelihood -1592.3262 -1572.7764 -1559.7738 
Ȥ2 77.79 75.32 102.73 
p> 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Notes: significant at *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 (robust standard errors in parentheses); All coefficients are 
compared to the benchmark category, shown in brackets. 
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